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 Health care services are recognised as a right. These services are available 
to "everyone" who needs them. This availability ensures that users, that is, 
persons who receive treatment in a health establishment or who are in need 
of health services, are able to have access to these services. Generally, 
health care services should be available without undue financial burden to 
users. This then means that the government is saddled with an added 
financial and administrative burden to ensure their availability to users. 
However, the availability of the services depends on the availability of 
resources. In cases where resources are diminished, users who may be in 
need of health care services may be excluded. Furthermore, the availability 
of access to health care services does not sufficiently guarantee the 
securing of users’ personal information. Thus, it is enquired what levels of 
safeguards do health establishments have to secure the personal 
information of users? Do these security mechanisms allow for the disclosure 
of personal information to third parties, and how? 
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1 Introduction 
South Africa has come a long a way in recognising the need to preserve the 
integrity of medical-related information.1 This recognition necessitates a 
study of the existing information security mechanisms that health 
establishments adopt.2 It demands a scrutiny of the extent to which this 
information can be used and depended upon in a manner that still maintains 
its quality and purpose. Before the Constitution3 came into effect, South 
African courts applied the "reasonable doctor test" in order to establish 
whether or not a reasonable attempt had been made to ensure the security 
of the medical-related information.4 This is evident inter alia in the case of 
Van Wyk v Lewis.5 In terms of the reasonable doctor test, the inquiry was 
made whether or not a reasonable doctor would have divulged a particular 
piece of information relating to a user.6 However, the reasonable doctor test 
was rejected by the court in the case of Castell v De Greef7 and 
subsequently in the case of Oldwage v Louwrens.8 The aforementioned 
cases promoted a shift from the doctor-centred approach to a patient-
centred approach in preserving the quality of medical-related information.9 
Specifically, the Castell case developed the doctrine of "informed consent". 
This doctrine accords with the South African human rights culture insofar as 
                                            
* Mzukisi Niven Njotini. LLB LLM LLD Cert Labour Dispute Resolution Practice. 
Professor, Department of Private Law, University of Johannesburg, South Africa. 
Email: mnjotini@gmail.com.  
1  IoDSA 2009 https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.iodsa.co.za/resource/resmgr/king_ 
iii/King_Report_on_Governance_fo.pdf defines the term "information" as the "raw 
data that has been verified to be accurate and timely, is specific and organised for a 
purpose, is presented within a context that gives it meaning and relevance and which 
leads to increase in understanding and decrease in uncertainty".  
2  In terms of s 1 of the National Health Act 61 of 2003, a health establishment refers 
to the "whole or part of a public or private institution, facility, building or place, 
whether for profit or not, that is operated or designed to provide inpatient or 
outpatient treatment, diagnostic or therapeutic interventions, nursing, rehabilitative, 
palliative, convalescent, preventative or other health services". 
3  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereinafter referred to the 
Constitution). 
4  See Richter v Estate Hamman 1976 3 SA 408 (C). 
5  In Van Wyk v Lewis 1924 AD 438 (hereinafter referred to as the Van Wyk case) the 
court stated that "in deciding what is reasonable the Court will have regard to the 
general level of skill and diligence possessed and exercised at the time by the 
members of the branch of the profession to which the practitioner belongs".  
6  Claassen and Verschoor Medical Negligence 15; Van Oosten 1995 De Jure 170. In 
terms of s 1 of the National Health Act 61 of 2003 a user means refers to the "person 
receiving treatment in a health establishment, including receiving blood or blood 
products, or using a health service". 
7  Castell v De Greef 1994 4 SA 408 (C) (hereinafter referred to as the Castell case). 
8  Oldwage v Louwrens 2004 1 All SA 532 (C). 
9  Thomas 2007 SALJ 190. 
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it enjoins a strict adherence to specific consumer prescripts that are 
commonly observed in contemporary societies.10 
As elaborate as the law relating to informed consent is, it still fails to cover 
the nature and extent of the security needed to safeguard medical-related 
information. Simply, the question is: how informed is consent?11 In 
examining this question, this paper is divided into four sections. Section 1 
scrutinises the meaning and essence of informed consent. It uses as the 
basis of its enquiry some of the provisions of the National Health Act. 
However, the discussion of informed consent does not seek to re-invent the 
wheel. Furthermore, it does not imply that a new description of informed 
consent is necessary. Simply, it aims to localise the nature and ambit of 
informed consent in an attempt to establish or re-establish the integrity or 
credibility of medical records in South Africa. The second section 
investigates issues relating to the manner of handling and safeguarding the 
information of users. The approaches to guaranteeing the inviolability of 
information followed inter alia in the Protection of Personal Information Act 
are scrutinised. The third section delves into the way forward for South 
Africa in preserving the security of information kept or stored by health 
establishments. This section discusses the idea of establishing critical 
information infrastructures. The fourth section of this paper is the 
conclusion. In this section, the facts presented in this paper are summarised 
and a legal framework to preserve the credibility of sensitive information 
stored by health establishments is presented. 
2 Informed consent 
2.1 Background 
In general, the term "informed consent" is based on the common law 
doctrine: volenti non fit iniuria.12 Simply, this doctrine denotes that "to a 
willing person, injury is not done".13 Within the context of South Africa, 
informed consent is a right. Initially, this right was accepted by the court in 
the case of Stoffberg v Elliot as an absolute right which the law protects.14 
Because of this, certain requirements must be met before the right to 
                                            
10  Castell case 423H-I. Within the context of South Africa, these consumer prescripts 
are dealt with in terms of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008. These have to do 
inter alia with a duty to inform patients of any indemnity clause in circumstances 
where such a clause excludes liability for a conduct that is likely to cause harm or 
injury. See s 49(2)(c) of the Consumer Protection Act. 
11  For an interesting reading on what other legal questions researchers could explore 
see Slabbert 2009 Obiter. 
12  See Christian Lawyers Association v Minister of Health (Reproductive Health 
Alliance as Amicus Curiae) 2005 1 SA 509 (T). 
13  Jackson Medical Law 134-135. 
14  Stoffberg v Elliot 1923 CPD 148 148. 
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informed consent can be said to exist. Firstly, the user must have knowledge 
or must be aware of the harm or risk.15 Secondly, he or she must appreciate 
and understand the nature and extent of the harm or risk.16 Thirdly, he or 
she must consent to the harm or risk. That is, the user must assume the 
harm or risk.17 Fourthly, the consent given must be intelligible. In other 
words, it must cover every aspect of the harm or risk.18 
In South Africa the right to informed consent is recognised in section 12(2) 
of the Constitution. This sub-section states that: 
Everyone has the right to bodily and psychological integrity, which includes 
the right to make decisions concerning reproduction; to security in and control 
over their body; and not to be subjected to medical or scientific experiments 
without their informed consent. 
"Security in" and "control over" have a particular meaning for the purposes 
of section 12(2) of the Constitution. The former relates to the "protection of 
bodily integrity against intrusions by the state and others"19 and the latter 
has to do with the "protection of what could be called bodily autonomy or 
self-determination against interference".20 
Therefore, the meaning of the right to informed consent in terms of section 
12(2) of the Constitution extends beyond what is normally referred to as 
consent. Specifically, it has to do with the practices that describe what is 
right and wrong,21 which can be established by examining the degree of skill 
and care that is reasonably applied in a particular circumstance.22 
Furthermore, it guarantees the patient’s autonomous right to decide. It does 
this by promoting the notion that a peculiar ideal of the person is the 
substance of his or her ethical or moral edifice.23  
It is worth mentioning that the foundation of an autonomous decision is inter 
alia that: 
…. moral debate about a particular course of action or controversy is often 
rooted not only in disagreement about the proper interpretation of applicable 
moral principles, but also in the interpretation of factual information and in 
                                            
15  Castell case 425H-I. 
16  Castell case 425H-I. 
17  Castell case 425H-I. 
18  Castell case 425H-I. 
19  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 287. 
20  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 287. 
21  Faden, Beauchamp and King Informed Consent 4-5. 
22  Van Wyk case 444; Mitchell v Dixon 1914 AD 519 525. 
23  See in general, Rawls 1980 Journal of Philosophy. Also see Downie and Telfer 1971 
Journal of Philosophy 301; Chima 2013 BMC Medical Ethics 1.  
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divergent assessments of the proper scientific, metaphysical, or religious 
description of a situation.24 
In this context manner, autonomy implies a responsibility to accept the 
consequences of one's decision. Consequently, a decision to consent is 
autonomous if it is given or furnished independently and voluntarily. In other 
words, it must exist consequent to information being given that influenced a 
user to make such a decision.25 This voluntariness accords with the principle 
that an autonomous user is generally self-governing.26 In other words, telling 
a user to act in a particular way or take a particular decision does not prevent 
a person from exercising autonomy in granting or refusing consent. 
However, if a decision is taken after the person has been told or 
commanded to act in a particular way or take a particular decision, this 
negates informed consent. An example of this is to be found in the case of 
Moore v Regents of the University of California.27 Moore, who was a patient 
at the time, had his spleen taken out or removed from his body with the aim 
of treating leukaemia. Samples of blood, bone marrow and other tissues 
were subsequently extracted from his body. He was then told by the hospital 
to amend his admission form to read that he consented to research being 
undertaken using the parts removed from his body. He duly amended the 
form as commanded. It was established later that Moore's physician and his 
assistant had created the Mo-cell line using the samples taken from Moore. 
Thereafter, they patented the line and made profit in a sum estimated at 3 
billion US Dollars. It could be asked if Moore had also given his informed 
consent to the creation of the Mo-cell line. In other words, is it legally justified 
to extend the informed consent given for the removal of a spleen to then 
create a profitable business? In South Africa, the issue relating to a change 
or altering of a statement of informed consent is dealt with in the Consumer 
Protection Act.28 In terms of this Act, the change must relate only to the 
indemnity clause in the admission form that intends to exclude liability 
resulting from an activity that could lead to the serious injury or death of a 
                                            
24  See Faden, Beauchamp and King Informed Consent 4. 
25  Castell case 426-427. For example, in the case of Rogers v Whitaker 1993 67 ALJR 
47 52, the court stated that: "The law should recognise that a doctor has a duty to 
warn a patient of a material risk inherent in the proposed treatment; a risk is material 
if, in the circumstances of the particular case, a reasonable person in the patient's 
position, if warned of the risk, would be likely to attach significance to it or if the 
medical practitioner is or should reasonably be aware that the particular patient, if 
warned of the risk, would be likely to attach significance to it. This duty is subject to 
the therapeutic privilege". 
26  Badhwar Worthwhile Life 83. 
27  See Moore v Regents of the University of California 51 Cal 3d 120 (1990). Also see 
Snyman Criminal Law 126-127. 
28  Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008. 
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user.29 Specifically, section 49(2)(c) of the Consumer Protection Act places 
a duty on health establishments to inform users of an indemnity clause that 
purports to exclude such liability. Accordingly, the provisions of section 
49(2)(c) of the Consumer Protection Act remedy the position of the law 
which existed since the case of Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom,30 which 
was that there was no duty to inform users of an indemnity clause. 
Nevertheless, the cardinal view is that the fact that the command to act in a 
particular manner comes from the government or is based on a "promise to 
abide by the will of the majority" does not really matter.31 The principle that 
"I am autonomous if I rule myself and no one else rules me" applies.32 This 
implies that the carrying out of the command must be justified in terms of 
section 36 of the Constitution. In other words, there must be a law of general 
application authorising the infringement of the rights in terms of section 
12(2) of the Constitution.33 An example of this relates to cases of non-trivial 
intrusions on bodily integrity with the aim of investigating and preventing 
wrongdoing. 
In practice, there are various ways in which the requirement of informed 
consent is typically circumvented. The so-called Havasupai case34 is but 
one such circumstance. In this case the plaintiff was the Havasupai tribe of 
the Havasupai Indian Reservation. The tribe consists of members who live 
in the Supai Village on the outskirts of the Grand Canyon. In 1989 an 
anthropology professor of Arizona State University conducted research on 
the tribe. The research examined the epidemic of diabetes among the tribal 
members. A diabetes-focussed project was then established in order to 
facilitate the intended research. This culminated in blood samples being 
drawn from more than 200 members of the tribe, who individually and 
independently furnished Arizona State University with their informed 
consent. Following this, the blood samples were stored and kept in 
laboratories held at Arizona State University. However, it transpired that the 
aforesaid University had carried out research or allowed others to carry out 
research unrelated35 to diabetes using the blood samples drawn from the 
Havasupai tribe. Specifically, the unrelated research was in relation to 
schizophrenia, migration and inbreeding. 
                                            
29  It is important to note that this exclusion does not include cases of "gross negligence" 
by health establishments. See s 51(c)(i) of the Consumer Protection Act. 
30  See Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 4 All SA 125 (SCA).  
31  Wolff Anarchism 41; Dworkin "Liberalism" 127. 
32  Feinberg Social Philosophy 21. 
33  See Minister of Safety and Security v Xaba 2004 1 SACR 149 (D); Tribe American 
Constitutional Law 1330. 
34  Havasupai Tribe of the Havasupai Reservation v. Arizona Board of Regents Nos 1 
CA-CV 07-0454, 1 CA-CV 07-0801 2008. 
35  Hereinafter referred to as the "unrelated research". 
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Therefore, the question to be asked is whether the informed consent of the 
members of the Havasupai tribe was necessary in these circumstances. Put 
differently, should Arizona State University have obtained the informed 
consent of the members of the Havasupai tribe before it conducted the 
unrelated research using the blood samples? Having failed to do so, what 
impact does the carrying out of this unrelated research have on the 
credibility of the research findings by Arizona State University? A 
spontaneous reader of ordinary prudence may find it possible to respond 
adequately to these questions. However, there is still legal uncertainty and 
indecision in relation to the processing36 and the manner of the handling 
and processing of the information arising from this unauthorised research. 
The section below investigates the essence of informed consent in the 
context of the National Health Act. It is argued that informed consent is 
pivotal in ensuring that medical-related information is handled and dealt with 
in terms of the law. 
2.2 The National Health Act 
Informed consent, as a notion, is not defined in the National Health Act. 
Simply, this Act provides that the informed consent of a user is required in 
cases where inter alia certain information is provided and a user makes or 
participates in taking particular decisions. On the one hand, section 6 of the 
National Health Act enjoins health establishments to inform a user, in a 
language which he or she understands,37 about his or her health status, the 
diagnosis procedures, the treatment options that are available to him or her, 
and the benefits, risks, costs and consequences connected with each of the 
options.38 Thereafter, a user must be informed of the right to refuse the 
services and the implications, risks and obligations of this refusal.39 
Consequently, health establishments should have due and special regard 
to the level of literacy of a user when communicating this information.40 On 
                                            
36  In this paper, the definition of the word "processing" contained in s 1 of the Protection 
of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013 (hereinafter referred to as the POPI Act) is 
preferred. In terms of this section processing means any operation or activity or any 
set of operations, whether or not by automatic means, concerning personal 
information, including – 
(a) the collection, receipt, recording, organisation, storage, updating or modification, 
retrieval, alteration, consultation or use; 
(b) dissemination by means of transmission, distribution or making available in any other 
form; or  
(c) merging, linking, as well as restriction, degradation, erasure or destruction of 
information. 
37  Section 6(2) of the National Health Act. 
38  Section 6(1)(a)-(d) of the National Health Act. 
39  Section 6(1)(a)-(d) of the National Health Act. 
40  Section 6(2) of the National Health Act. Also see Issacs v Pandie 2012 ZAWCHC 47 
(16 May 2012).  
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the other hand, section 8 of the National Health Act regulates situations 
where informed consent is mandatory in order for a user to make or 
participate in taking certain decisions. These include circumstances in which 
the decision relates to the personal health or treatment of a user.41 
Given the inability of the National Health Act to provide meaning to the term 
informed consent, it is then imperative to examine sources external to the 
latter Act. One such source is the Health Professions Council of South 
Africa's (HPCSA) Guidelines for Good Practice in the Health Care 
Professions, 2008.42 The HPCSA Guidelines, 2008 states the following: 
Successful relationships between health care practitioners and patients 
depend upon mutual trust. To establish that trust practitioners must respect 
patients' autonomy – their right to decide whether or not to undergo any 
medical intervention, even where a refusal may result in harm to themselves 
or in their own death. Patients must be given sufficient information in a way 
that they can understand, to enable them to exercise their right to make 
informed decisions about their care. This is what is meant by an informed 
consent.43 
This states that informed consent is not only a casual arrangement between 
health establishments and their clients. Importantly, it is a sine qua non for 
the existence of a relationship of trust between health establishments their 
clients. In this respect, the provisions of section 1 of the POPI Act apply. 
This section enumerates factors to determine whether informed consent is 
required in a particular case. Firstly, it states that consent is informed if it is 
made voluntarily by a user.44 Secondly, it provides that the requisite consent 
must be specific or must have been made in unambiguous terms.45 In other 
words, it must amount to an informed expression of the will of a user.46 
Therefore, before consent can be said to be informed, it has to illustrate the 
ability of a user to deliberate on a particular decision affecting his or her 
personal health. This view seems to be followed by Andanda, amongst 
others.47 Andanda explains the essence of informed consent by stating that 
the required consent must amount to a collective declaration by both the 
health establishments and their users.48  
                                            
41  Section 8(1) of the National Health Act. 
42  Hereinafter referred to as the HPCSA Guidelines, 2008. 
43  The HPCSA Guidelines, 2008 1. 
44  Section 1 of the POPI Act. It is important to note that circumstances may arise 
wherein a user may not be able to give the necessary consent. In such cases, any 
person who is mandated by a user in writing to grant consent on his or her behalf or 
is authorised to give such consent in terms of any law or court order may be allowed 
to give the consent. See s 7(1)(a) and (b) of the Act. 
45  Section 1 of the POPI Act. 
46  Section 1 of the POPI Act. 
47  Andanda 2005 Dev World Bioeth 16. 
48  Andanda 2005 Dev World Bioeth 14. 
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As simple as the narrative explained above may be, it still does not elucidate 
situations where consent is required in relation to the processing of clients' 
information. Let us suppose that in the Havasupai case the issue related to 
the research project was based on the information, and not the actual blood 
samples, of the Havasupai tribe. In other words, Arizona State University 
drew blood samples from the members of the Havasupai tribe, stored the 
blood samples and on its online computers recorded the information relating 
to the fact, for example, that some members of the tribe are prone to 
diabetes and others are not. Some of the questions to ask would be: 
 What legal limits exist or should exist to regulate the proper handling 
and processing of this information?  
 Specifically, is the informed consent of the Havasupai tribe necessary 
before the information relating to the blood samples is handled and 
dealt with?  
 Does this handling and processing become immaterial given that the 
information is stored online? 
It has been stated already that informed consent depends on the presence 
of certain requirements. These have to do with the fact that a user must be 
aware of, appreciate, understand and consent to a particular harm or risk.49 
In terms of the Consumer Protection Act, this informed consent is absent in 
cases where there is gross negligence on the part of a health establishment. 
In view of this, the section below delves into the manner of handling and 
processing users' medical-related information.50 It also examines certain 
                                            
49  See the Castell case 425H-I. 
50  See s 1 of the POPI Act. In terms of the latter section, personal information means 
information about an identifiable, living, natural person, and where it is applicable, 
an identifiable, existing juristic person, including, but not limited to – "(a) information 
relating to the race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, national, ethnic or social 
origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, physical or mental health, well-being, 
disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language, and birth of the person; (b) 
information relating to the education or the medical, financial, criminal or employment 
history of the person; (c) any identifying number, symbol, e-mail address, physical 
address, telephone number, location information, online identifier or other particular 
assignment to the person; (d) the biometric information of the person; € the personal 
opinions, views or preferences of the person; (f) correspondence sent by the person 
that is implicitly or explicitly of a private or confidential nature or further 
correspondence that would the contents of the original correspondence; (g) the view 
or opinions of another individual about the person; and (h) the name of the person if 
it appears with other personal information relating to the person or if the disclosure 
of the name itself would reveal information about the person." See also s 1 of the 
Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000. 
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related provisions for processing personal information in terms of the POPI 
Act. 
3 The POPI Act 
3.1 General overview 
The POPI Act came about because of the need to respond to advances in 
information and communication technology.51 The developments have 
expanded the extent to which personal information can be accessed and 
used. With these advances it became evident that personal information 
requires protection.52 Weisbrot elucidates the impact that these ICTs have 
by stating that: 
Recent advances in information, communication and surveillance 
technologies have created and intensified a range of privacy issues. The 
internet, biometrics, digital phones and cameras, powerful computers and 
radio-frequency identification have all contributed to making it easier, cheaper 
and faster for government agencies and business organizations to collect, 
store and aggregate large amounts of personal and sensitive information.53 
Given the emergence of these technologies, South Africa promulgated the 
POPI Act in order to give effect to section 14 of the Constitution. The Act 
provides measures to protect the processing of personal information.54 It 
does this by creating conditions under which personal information may be 
processed lawfully.55 Furthermore, it saddles responsible parties with a duty 
to process personal information belonging to "data subjects".56 Responsible 
parties can be public or private bodies which or any person who determines 
the purpose of or means for processing personal information.57 Within the 
context of this paper, these responsible parties have the same powers of 
handling and processing personal information as have health 
establishments. 
Understandably, the collection of personal information precedes the actual 
processing thereof. In other words, the first step is to collect personal 
                                            
51  Hereinafter referred to as "ICTs". 
52  Article 8(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000). 
53  Weisbrot 2008 https://www.alrc.gov.au/news-media/2008/media-briefing-
technology-neutral-privacy-principles-should-govern-rapidly-developin. Also see 
Holtzman Privacy Lost 5-14. 
54  Section 2(a) of the POPI Act. 
55  Section 2(b) of the POPI Act. 
56  Data subject is the term used in s 1 of the POPI Act to describe the person to whom 
personal information relates. It is argued that the term shares particular 
characteristics with the word "user" described above. For the sake of completeness, 
the word "user" is preferred in this paper. Thus, reference to a user shall, within the 
context of this paper, also refer to a data subject, or vice versa. 
57  Section 1 of the POPI Act. 
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information from users, and whereafter it is possible to commence with the 
processing.58 Specifically, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) states that the reason for collecting personal 
information should be specified not later than at the time of collection.59 
Because personal information is collected for a particular purpose,60 such a 
purpose must be specific, defined explicitly and be made by lawful and fair 
means.61 This means that a user must be informed of the purposes for which 
the collection is made.62 This communication can be in the form envisaged 
in section 18(1) of the POPI Act. However, the requirement of collecting 
personal information by these means can be waived by adhering to the 
conditions set out in section 18(4) of the POPI Act. These conditions are 
dealt with the section (Processing Procedure) below. 
3.2 Processing procedure 
Chapter 3 of the POPI Act deals with the conditions under which personal 
information may be processed. These conditions are not discretionary as 
such. Instead, responsible parties have a duty to ensure that the conditions 
and the measures that give effect to these conditions are complied with.63 
Condition 2 of Chapter 3 of the POPI Act covers issues relating to the lawful 
processing of personal information. The aforesaid Condition states that 
personal information must be processed lawfully and in a reasonable 
manner.64 The OECD seems to accept this manner of processing personal 
information.65 However, the OECD prefers the term "fair means" of 
processing.66 The preference for the fair processing of personal information 
does not necessarily render the approach that South Africa adopts to 
processing personal information insignificant. This is so, because the notion 
of fairness is said to be "part and parcel of the concept of lawfulness".67 
Therefore, lawfulness, reasonableness and fairness require that grounds 
should exist that justify the processing. In South Africa, the accepted 
grounds of justification are private defence, necessity and consent.68 
                                            
58  See s 14(1)(a) of the POPI Act. 
59  See OECD 2013 https://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/2013-oecd-privacy-
guidelines.pdf (hereinafter referred to as the OECD Guidelines". 
60  See Condition 3 (Purpose Specification) of Chapter 3 of the POPI Act. 
61  Section 13(1) of the POPI Act; Recommendation 7 of the OECD Guidelines. 
62  Section 13(2) of the POPI Act. 
63  Section 8 of the POPI Act. 
64  Section 9(a) and (b) of the POPI Act. 
65  See OECD 2013 https://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/2013-oecd-privacy-
guidelines.pdf. 
66  Recommendation 7 of the OECD Guidelines. Also see art 8(2) of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000). 
67  Roos 2006 CILSA 105-111. 
68  Snyman Criminal Law 103-129. 
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A lawful, reasonable or fair means of processing personal information 
should foster a processing framework that safeguards the privacy of a 
user.69 Specifically, the framework has to have measures to preserve the 
integrity, confidentiality and authenticity of personal information.70 Simply, 
the measures must prevent any loss of, damage to or unauthorised 
destruction of personal information.71 Furthermore, they must deter the 
unlawful accessing or processing of personal information.72 In doing so, 
responsible parties must identify all reasonably foreseeable internal and 
external risks - such as risks to privacy and identity73 - to personal 
information in their possession or under their control.74 They must also 
establish and maintain appropriate safeguards against the risks identified.75 
Furthermore, they must regularly verify that the safeguards are effectively 
implemented.76 Lastly, they must guarantee that the safeguards are 
continually updated in response to the new risks or deficiencies in previously 
implemented safeguards.77 
Lastly, the fundamental principle of our law seems to be that personal 
information must be processed with the requisite consent.78 Specifically, a 
user, or his or her guardian, must provide the necessary consent to the 
processing.79 The consent to the processing of information follows the 
collection process. However, there are circumstances wherein the informed 
consent of a user may not be mandatory. For example, the consent is not 
necessarily required in cases where the processing is desirable in order to 
carry out, conclude or perform actions in terms of an agreement to which 
the data subject is a party.80 Secondly, the consent is not necessary in 
situations where the processing is done in compliance with an obligation 
imposed by law.81 Thirdly, it is not mandatory to obtain consent in 
circumstances where the processing is designed to protect the legitimate 
interests of a user.82 Fourthly, consent may not be sought if the processing 
                                            
69  Section 9(b) of the POPI Act; Bennett Regulating Privacy 23; Da Veiga and Martins 
2015 CLSR 246. 
70  ISO 2013 http://mahdi.hashemitabar.com/cms/images/Download/ISO/iso-iec-
27002-2013-english.pdf. 
71  Section 19(1)(a) of the POPI Act. Also see Recommendation 11 of OECD 
Guidelines. 
72  Section 19(1)(b) of the POPI Act. 
73  Roos 2006 CILSA 105-107. 
74  Section 19(2)(a) of the POPI Act. 
75  Section 19(2)(b) of the POPI Act. 
76  Section 19(2)(c) of the POPI Act. 
77  Section 19(2)(d) of the POPI Act. 
78  Section 11(1)(a) of the POPI Act. 
79  Section 11(1)(a) of the POPI Act. 
80  Section 11(1)(b) of the POPI Act. 
81  Section 11(1)(c) of the POPI Act. For further reading see Recommendation 10 of the 
OECD Guidelines. 
82  Section 11(1)(d) of the POPI Act. 
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is needed for the proper performance of a public law duty by a public body.83 
Fifthly, consent is not needed where the processing is essential for following 
the legitimate interests of the responsible party or of a third party to whom 
the personal information is supplied.84 
In summary, informed consent presupposes a formal knowledge or 
awareness of the harm or risk to a user. Specifically, the consent must be 
such that it enables a user to make an informed decision about the harm or 
risk that could result inter alia in serious bodily injury or death. Accordingly, 
health establishments have a duty to inform and users have a 
corresponding responsibility to take informed decisions. The duty to inform 
and to be informed does not relate only to the actual harm or injury as such. 
It also pertains to the manner of collecting and processing medical-related 
information that is crucial to the responsibility to take informed decisions. 
This collection and processing of information is regulated by the POPI Act, 
which deals with the fair, reasonable, justifiable and lawful manner of 
processing medical-related information. It also regulates situations where 
the informed consent of a user may not be required. 
The section below covers the way forward for South Africa in preserving the 
integrity of medical-related information. It is argued that information 
infrastructures are the possible solutions for keeping records of users and 
monitoring the processing of information online. These infrastructures could 
be in the form of online databases and could be kept and monitored by heath 
establishments.  
4 Way forward to preserve the integrity of medical-related 
information 
Generally, health establishments are required to process the personal 
information of users in a lawful and reasonable manner. In other words, they 
should adopt fair means of processing personal information. Fair means 
could include those mechanisms or grounds that provide reasonable 
justifications for the processing. Within the context of this paper, these 
grounds of justification include cases where specific information is provided 
and a user takes or participates in taking certain decisions.85 In this respect, 
the informed consent of users should validate the processing.86 The consent 
must be made voluntarily by users. Conversely, it must constitute an 
                                            
83  Section 11(1)(e) of the POPI Act; S v Bailey 1981 4 SA 187 (N). 
84  Section 11(1)(f) of the POPI Act. 
85  See s 6 read with s 8 of the National Health Act. 
86  For the exceptions to the requirement of informed consent in processing personal 
information, see s 11(a)-(f) of the POPI Act. 
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autonomous choice to accept the processing of his or her personal 
information. 
Because personal information is fundamental to a user, processes 
associated with preserving the integrity, confidentiality and authenticity of 
such information are essential. These processes relate not only to the 
information per se, but they also have an impact on the security of the place 
where and the manner in which the information is stored. Thus, is it still 
necessary to disregard recent developments in ICTs by having records 
containing personal information of users in physical files kept in offline 
storerooms? Answering this question will require one to undertake a 
complete study of the information security mechanisms available to South 
Africa. One example of such measures relates to the establishment of 
critical databases. A critical database is a collection of critical data in 
electronic form from which it may be accessed, reproduced or extracted.87 
In turn, critical data is data88 that is declared by the Minister89 in terms of 
section 53 to be essential to the protection of the national security of the 
Republic or the economic and social well-being of its citizens.90 
Chapter IX of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act provides 
a framework for the establishment of critical databases. Basically, the 
Minister identifies critical data and databases.91 The Minister does this by 
deciding which information should be identified as fundamental to the 
protection of the national security of South Africa.92 Consequently, he or she 
has extensive powers to categorise information according to the importance 
that it has to the security and protection of the economic and social 
wellbeing of South African citizens.93 As soon as it is identified, the Minister 
creates provisions for the registration of critical databases.94 This could be 
in the form of rules that provide for the registration of the full names, 
addresses and contact details of the critical database administrator;95 the 
location of the critical data and database or their component parts, and a 
                                            
87  Section 1 of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 
(hereinafter referred to as the ECT Act). 
88  In terms of s 1 of the ECT Act the term data refers to the electronic representation of 
information in any form. 
89  Within the context of the ECT Act, Minister refers to the Minister of Communications. 
See s 1 of the ECT Act. 
90  Section 1 of the ECT Act. 
91  Section 53 of the ECT Act. 
92  Section 53(a) of the ECT Act. 
93  Section 53(a) of the ECT Act. 
94  Section 54 of the ECT Act. 
95  A critical database administrator is the person who is responsible for the 
management and control of a critical databases. See s 1 of the ECT Act. 
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general description of the information stored in the critical database.96 
Subsequently, a critical database administrator may be appointed in order 
to manage, control and administer the operation of a critical database.97 
The rationale for establishing critical databases is to guarantee that medical-
related information is protected from the risk of loss, damage and 
unauthorised destruction. Because of this, specific rules should be 
established that stipulate the manner of accessing, transferring and 
controlling critical databases; the infrastructural and procedural rules and 
requirements for securing the reliability of critical databases, and the 
measures and technological methods to be used in storing and archiving 
critical databases.98 In addition, the rules ought to set out specific disaster 
recovery plans in cases where the loss, damage or destruction of medical-
related information occurs.99 
5 Conclusion 
South Africa recognises the need to preserve the confidentiality of medical-
related information. Initially, a doctor-centred approach was preferred, 
which referenced what a reasonable doctor would do when in possession 
of the information. Nowadays, a patient-centred approach is followed. This 
approach promotes the idea that the ability to make an informed decision 
regarding a potential harm depends on the strength of the information given 
by health establishments. In other words, the more users are informed, the 
more likely they are to make informed decisions. However, it is evidenced 
that the extent of the informed consent has not yet been examined. In other 
words, the pre-occupation has always been on the fact that users must 
furnish health establishments with their informed consent, but the question 
relating to the nature and degree of the informed has been left unanswered. 
Generally, it is argued that a certain amount of due diligence has to be 
applied to guarantee that the integrity of medical-related information is 
maintained. Simply, users must be assured that their medical-related 
information will be used for the purpose for which it was collected. This can 
be achieved by ensuring that health establishments process this information 
in a lawful and reasonable manner. Fair means ought generally to be used 
in order to effect the processing. These relate to preventing the loss of, 
damage to or unauthorised destruction of information. Specifically, the 
means used in processing information must be aimed at promoting its 
                                            
96  Section 54(2)(a)-(c) of the ECT Act. The recording of these particulars may, however, 
be waived at the Minister's discretion in terms of s 55(2)(a) and (b) of the ECT Act. 
97  Section 1 of the ECT Act. 
98  Section 55(1) of the ECT Act. 
99  Section 55(1)(e)) of the ECT Act. For further reading on the powers of the Minister, 
see generally s 55(2) of the ECT Act. 
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integrity, confidentiality and authenticity. For the processing to be carried 
out, the informed consent of users is essential. This consent must be given 
voluntarily by users. Specifically, it must be the autonomous expression of 
the users' will or decision. Furthermore, the consent has to be given in a 
language that users understand and are able to speak. Generally, the 
degree of the informed consent should not be limited only to the likelihood 
of harm or risk. It ought to be extended to the medical-related information 
that brings about the need to give the necessary consent. This then enjoins 
health establishment to have regard to the manner in which this information 
is collected and processed. 
In this paper, establishing critical databases is said to be pivotal in 
preserving the integrity of medical-related information. Such databases 
would ensure that the information is processed only by those who have the 
necessary authority to do so. This authority will be determined by factors 
regarding, amongst others, whether users consented to the processing, if 
the processing is necessary in terms of the law, or if the processing is 
required in order to abide by an order made by the court. To ensure their 
functionality, critical databases have to be controlled and managed by 
administrators situated in health establishments. Therefore, health 
establishment will have to generate rules regulating how to access and 
control critical databases, how to preserve the credibility of critical 
databases, and how to record, store and archive medical-related 
information that is stored in these databases. Furthermore, the rules should 
illustrate the disaster recovery plans in cases where there is the risk of the 
loss of, damage to or the destruction of this information. 
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